Robert Jay Lifton, a psychiatrist and thinker has given a lecture on war and political violence going over the danger of apocalyptic movements and visions as destructive forces that seek to heal the world by destroying most of it. He is one of the first to have studied the psychological impact of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima. An excerpt of his talk below:
Lifton points out that the wielding of nuclear weapons by superpowers generates a psychological and political climate that promotes proliferation of nuclear weapons. He has also pointed out that the existence of nuclear weapons, as weapons that can for the first time in human history end our very existence as a species, has had a deep impact on our symbols of human continuity and immortality. Where we might invest a sort of symbolic immortality of ourselves into our children, cultural and creative works, or social-political accomplishments. These powerful symbols of our continued presence reaching beyond our mortal lives have for the first time come under serious threat.
Lifton claims that the existence of nuclear weapons combined with increasingly rapid historical and technological changes in more recent human generations, and the increasing bombardment of images from contemporary media, help to erode central visions of a long-lasting truth as well as undermine our claims to symbolic immortality, since, after all, it is now conceivable that the human species might be wiped out in a nuclear war.
Lifton also discusses psychological concepts that might permit survivors of atrocities to deal with the gross excess of trauma they were faced with, and briefly explores the mind of perpetrators of mass violence. This discussion is available in an hour long interview, below:
Three war games have recently reviewed the US and Israeli options and outcomes in the face of Iran’s nuclear program. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has very briefly analyzed these games and has presented its own conclusions.
I am here going to respond to Jeffrey White’s analysis of these games. I am most interested in his choice of language, and unfortunately only have the time to comment on two out of the three games.
White provides highlights of the Harvard war game, which had as its goal an investigation of the general evolution of events and international actions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.
1) The US could not organize “meaningful support for sanctions.”
2) Russia and China engaged in their own “secret negotiations with Iran.”
3) Iran ‘won’ the game by increasing its supply of uranium and “was proceeding to weaponization.”
1) The game is conducted by an American institution and focuses on the central role of the US as the catalyst or primary actor, seemingly subordinating other state actors as responders to US policy on the issue. That the US could not coordinate sanctions may well be rewritten as any number of other states having varying levels of ‘success’ in rolling out their own plans. I don’t here mean to say that the agency of other states is not recognized by individual players who represent state actors, but rather that we should be aware that the game assumes the central motive of investigating US interests in degrees related to a binary dimension, success/failure. This game assumes then that the dominant articulation of US interest in regards to Iran, the Middle East, and Asia, is an inviolate constant. It does not investigate international interest, simply US interest. I would argue that it investigates this the issue not simply from the point of view of war games conducted by the interested nation’s institution but also assumes the given that US power is hegemonic, if not implying that US hegemony is good then at least ignoring the question entirely. I argue that ignoring the question of articulating power can lead to or facilitate a quest to maximize power for power’s sake and forgetting why an exertion of national will is necessary in the first place. The danger inherent in accepting dominant paradigms of trans-regional power is that actors may forget that it may well be desirable to seek political action for something other than the accumulation of power but may be the means to a multitude of goals.
2) That it would be stated that Russia and China would seek “secret” negotiations with Iran relates to my first point. It suggests that any negotiation with Iran outside the schema presented by US arbitration or national interest is a breach of some unvoiced law. What is here meant by secret? That the US or those of its allies in full compliance with its national interest were not invited to bilateral talks between Russia or China and Iran? Just as the US and European nations have the right, as independent state actors, to enter into private negotiations with a second party, I would think that China or Russia would also enter into dialogue with those they see fit without necessarily seeking outside approval. If the full transcript of bilateral talks are not made available in the case of the US and some second party, this might be for the reason of its national interest, such as the mutable outcome of sensitive negotiations not yet concluding in formal agreement. That the bilateral talks of non-US actors working independently of this forcibly centralized player are articulated as “secret” suggests a displeasure with independent action that may be counter to US interest, but disguises this self-interest as a form of breach that requires secrecy.
3) Here is revealed another assumption made by the game, that Iran, without question, seeks to have nuclear weapons. The nature of Iran’s nuclear program is not questioned, it is presented as a weapons program. Within this assumption is inscribed the message that the program is an act of aggression against the US, meaning that it is contrary to US interest. Here is assumed that the US has a right, perhaps it would be worded as a responsibility in some journals, to exert its political, economic, and military power within the Asian continent, far from its shores and that local actors must not have the power to threaten US monopoly on violence. This relates very much to the symbolic reduction of US wars of aggression within the region, such as in the case of Iraq, to police action in which the police/US has the right to violence while other states must be presented as subjects — international citizens — in a necessarily undefined global system in which their actions could well be regarded as criminal if it falls outside US interest. Such a schema is perhaps best articulated in a paper written for the US military, Joint Vision 2020, in which the idea of American full spectrum dominance is explained as:
The label full spectrum dominance implies that US forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains – space, sea, land, air, and information. Additionally, given the global nature of our interests and obligations, the United States must maintain its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance.
Next, White discusses the highlights of a related war game that was conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. This game investigates US-Israel relation along with potential for Israeli responses to Iran’s nuclear program. White outlines the following highlights from the Tel Aviv war game:
1) The game assumes a clear objective for Iran: “obtaining nuclear weapons.”
2) Israel and the US did not have clear strategies nor clear goals in confronting Iran.
3) Iran ‘wins’, and continues its nuclear program.
1) This war game also assumes that Iran seeks to have nuclear weapons, generating a scenario on the very basis of an intractable conflict. There is no deviation from weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program and therefore diplomatic negotiations could not possibly succeed. In order to have Iran refrain from building nuclear bombs, you must force it to do so, through economic, political, or military threats or actions. Beyond the assumption that Iran must want nuclear weapons is the treatment of the nuclear program in isolation from the very state actors who are here presented as the side (though a fractured side) facing a common foe in Iran. Israel and US, it is assumed, have a right to nuclear weapons. The impact of Israeli nuclear weapons on politics, and military programs within the region are entirely ignored in this particular scenario. To explore it would mean questioning it. Anyway, Israel does not publicly acknowledge that it has nuclear weapons. To do so, or to discuss this topic might result in the question of how it developed them in the first place, which of course included European and US aid. Israel has not signed on to the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US and all nuclear capable European countries have. Under the NPT, it is not allowed that signatories help non-signatories develop a nuclear program, let alone a weaponized one. So, the NATO countries involved in this affair are in breach of what is supposed to be a binding international treaty that they helped create. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is meant to help police the accountability of signatories that may be implicated in a breach of the NPT, which permits the development of a civilian nuclear program but limits weaponization. The IAEA is thus involved in the case of Iran yet it is not involved in the case of the open secret of Israel nor of Western involvement in Israel’s nuclear development. This might bring into question the objectivity of the NPT, or rather of its application. It suggests, then, that it is OK for some countries to have nuclear programs, even nuclear weapons, but not OK for others to have them. If the application of the NPT is not universal, and in fact we witness a clear miss on its application in the case of the only nuclear weapons holder in the Middle East, then we must conclude that the NPT is at the very least flawed. Whether by flaw or purpose, it has in this case served to help maintain a power dynamic and problematic articulation of international law in which one side — Iran — is investigated because of accusation by the US, while another side — Israel — who happens to be an integrated ally of the US does not have to even worry about investigation. So, here we see that the application of an international treaty moves according to the existing dynamic of global power which favours the dominant player and its close allies.
2) The lack of clarity in terms of goals and strategies does not immediately seem clear to me when reading White’s review of the Tel Aviv war game. In reading further sections of the short report, I wonder if it simply means that they did not have common goals, or that goals and strategies were not clear enough because the US did not come forward with preconditions and ultimatums then seek these out through any means possible including military aggression.
3) That Iran wins the war game fits into the binary world we are presented throughout the report, with Iran on one side and US-Israel on the other. One is bad, the other is good, implicitly. Therefore, there is no need to critically examine the impact of each state action within the context of a multitude of national and sub-national needs or interests; it is assumed here that good and bad are inherent to each party. Perhaps the confusion lies in that the dimension of national interest embedded in power politics is taken as the judge of good and bad. In this case, if a situation or action contrasts with Israeli or US national interest reduced to a game of power politics then the need to examine its effect on the many peoples of the world is diminished. Inversely, what is good for the interested parties must be good for everyone, or is for the good of everyone.
Al Jazeera’s program, Empire, investigates the war on terror as perceived by some of those whose countries are targeted.
Guns for hire are increasingly being used in US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, their numbers rising to shocking levels. These mercenaries are mainly paid for by the US, and their numbers often match or exceed those of foreign and local troops. 217,892 private security operate in Afghanistan and Iraq versus 192,000 US troops.
104,101 mercenaries (1)
68,000 US troops (2), plus 30,000 (3) more announced for a new total of 98,000
32,000 non-US foreign troops, plus 5,000 more announced for a new total of about 37,000 (3)
90,000 Afghan National Army (4), with a planned expansion to 134,000 troops by 2011 (5)
80,000 Afghan National Police (4), with a planned expansion to 82,000 by 2011 (5)
28.396 million estimated total population (6)
113,731 mercenaries (1)
124,000 US troops (1)
28,945,657 total population (7)
400, rough estimation of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1)
From philosophy bites:
If someone is shooting at me in a war, surely it is morally acceptable for me to shoot back and kill him or her. Jeff McMahan of Rutgers University, author of a new book on this topic, challenges the view that such killing is always acceptable.
Roundup of Analysis and Investigative Articles: Propaganda, nuclear proliferation, and sudden evictions
Perceptions of identity: Islamist identity and neoconservatism. We are at a point of conflict and growing instability in the Middle East where the West’s projection of its perception of Islamist identity is no longer recognizable to Islamists themselves; and the Islamist perception of American motivation for actions has little if any resonance with ordinary Americans. Both sides are ideologically committed to the correctness of their perception of the other’s identity. (Conflict Forum)
The India-US Nuclear Deal at a Crossroads. As the US-India-Japan-Australia-Singapore joint military exercise styled Operation Malabar was conducted in early September, reverberations were felt not only in China, but also in India. The US-India nuclear agreement, driving a nail deep into the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, has produced sharp debate within Indian politics, including in the ruling coalition. (Praful Bidwai, Japan Focus)
Militarizing Japan: Patriotism, Profit, and Children’s Print Media, 1894-1925. The January 1922 issue of Shonen kurabu (Boy’s Club) carried the first episode of an exciting new “hot-blooded novel” (nekketsu shosetsu) drawn from the fertile imagination of noted children’s writer Miyazaki Ichiu. For fourteen consecutive issues Miyazaki enthralled Japanese children with depictions of Japanese valour and the Yamato spirit (Yamato damashii) locked in a titanic struggle against a duplicitous and rapacious foreign enemy. The fate of the navy and of the nation itself hung in the balance. The Imperial navy fought valiantly against a technologically superior foe but was ultimately destroyed. Then, in Japan’s darkest hour, the nation was saved by a group of true patriots, led by a child warrior commanding a powerful new technology. All Japan wept. This was the Future War Between Japan and America, “the greatest naval battle in history.” (Owen Griffiths, Japan Focus)
The war on Gaza’s children. An entire generation of Palestinians in Gaza is growing up stunted: physically and nutritionally stunted because they are not getting enough to eat; emotionally stunted because of the pressures of living in a virtual prison and facing the constant threat of destruction and displacement; intellectually and academically stunted because they cannot concentrate — or, even if they can, because they are trying to study and learn in circumstances that no child should have to endure. Even before Israel this week declared Gaza “hostile territory” — apparently in preparation for cutting off the last remaining supplies of fuel and electricity to 1.5 million men, women and children — the situation was dire. (Saree Makdisi , LA Times)
House Demolitions. On June 10th 1967, the Israeli government demolished the Moroccan Quarter in the Old City of East Jerusalem to make easier public access to the Western Wall. After the Israeli army called on the inhabitants of the quarter to vacate their homes only a couple of hours before the demolitions took place, a call which was not heard by everybody in the quarter, 135 houses were demolished along with two mosques and other sites. 650 inhabitants were left homeless and several others dead under the rubble of their homes. This demolition was not the first of its kind in the Occupied Palestinian Territories but definitely the starting point to a lifetime struggle with illegal house demolitions by the Israel Occupying forces. (Miftah)
Beyond the rhetoric. “We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war.” French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner’s remarks about Iran, later softened, made ahead of a visit to Moscow on Monday, signalled a qualitative shift not only in the French but the European position towards Iran. They cannot be dismissed as empty rhetoric or grandstanding. Kouchner, after all, is in a better position than most to know what is happening behind the scenes in international politics from Iran to Gaza. He has a reputation as an astute reader of indicators, as a politician sensitive to nuance. (Mustafa El-Labbad, Al-Ahram)
Arms, The Big Deal. Encouraged by New Delhi, a host of Indian companies are currently negotiating with European arms giants to acquire strategic stakes, get into manufacturing and bid for deals. It is reliably learnt that global giants from Austria, the Czech Republic, Sweden, France, Britain, Poland, Romania and Russia are keen to offload stakes to Indian heavy engineering companies. Highly placed sources told TEHELKA that a number of high-level delegations from European firms have visited Indian companies to check out the latter’s interest level. (Shantanu Guha Ray, Tehelka)